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Alpenglow (aSOLX) Whitepaper v1.1

Solana‑compatible experimental mainnet (hard‑fork) • Parallel execution network • Low‑latency finality

This document extends v0.9 with formalized sections on system/threat models, protocol sketches, economic functions, governance processes, benchmarking, and a risk matrix. If there is any inconsistency with live parameters, on‑chain records and official announcements prevail.

Table of Contents

  1. Executive Summary
  2. Background & Motivation
  3. System Assumptions & Threat Model
  4. Protocol Design (Votor Consensus & Rotor Propagation)
  5. Execution & Runtime (Sealevel, Token‑2022)
  6. Performance Goals & Benchmark Methodology
  7. Token Economics (Supply, Allocation, Emissions)
  8. Sale & Distribution (Public Sale, Airdrop, Compliance)
  9. Governance
  10. Security
  11. Cross‑Chain & Ecosystem
  12. Roadmap
  13. Transparency & Status Page
  14. Risk Factors & Disclosures
  15. Glossary
  16. Appendix (Params, Pseudocode, TBF)

1. Executive Summary

Alpenglow aims to remain fully compatible with the Solana ecosystem while pursuing ~100–150 ms p95 transaction finality via Votor (a fast‑finality path with fallback) and Rotor (one‑hop‑first dissemination with congestion control). Under adverse conditions (up to ~20% byzantine validators plus ~20% offline, engineering target), the chain is designed to preserve liveness. Target use‑cases include high‑frequency finance, real‑time gaming, and AI/DePIN/IoT micropayments.

2. Background & Motivation

3. System Assumptions & Threat Model

3.1 System & Network Model

3.2 Actors

3.3 Adversarial Capabilities

3.4 Goals

4. Protocol Design

4.1 Votor: Low‑Latency Finality (Design Sketch)

Idea: combine a fast‑path with single/double voting rounds and a slow‑path with timeouts/leader changes. Validators maintain a lock on the highest observed QC to prevent disordered rollbacks.

Objects

Fast‑Path (illustrative)

  1. Leader proposes b_t and broadcasts.
  2. Validators vote v_t if not conflicting with their lock.
  3. Aggregated QC_t (≥ 2/3) is broadcast by leader.
  4. If QC_{t-1} and QC_t are adjacent and lock rules are met, commit Parent(b_t) (or b_{t-1}).
  5. Otherwise or on timeout, the pacemaker elevates the round and the leader rotates (slow‑path).

Safety Intuition (Informal)

Let N be participants, B a byzantine subset, and G the honest subset. If |B|/|N| < 1/3 and lock monotonicity holds, two conflicting commit chains cannot both obtain admissible QC sequences. Formal proofs and state‑machine definitions will be released with audits.

4.2 Rotor: One‑Hop‑First Dissemination

Message complexity: traditional multi‑layer fanout ~ O(n log n); one‑hop‑first with stable topology approaches ~ O(n), reducing duplicates.

4.3 Execution & Runtime

5. Performance Goals & Benchmark Methodology

5.1 Metrics

5.2 Testbed & Methods

6. Token Economics (aSOLX)

6.1 Basics

6.2 Allocation & Vesting

Bucket Share Vesting / Lockup Notes
Public Sale 8% Per announcement; liquid by TGE rules Self‑custody; contract delivery
DEX Liquidity 2% LP lock ≥ 12 months Initial pool & price discovery
Treasury/Reserve 10% Multisig governed R&D/marketing/partnerships
Strategic 10% 6‑month cliff + 24‑month linear
Team & Advisors 15% 12‑month cliff + 36‑month linear
Staking Rewards 20% 4‑year emissions Network security & delegation
Ecosystem/Foundation 20% ≥ 12‑month linear Developers & incubation
Community Airdrop 15% Programmatic distribution Anti‑Sybil & task‑linked

6.3 Staking Emission Function (4 years)

Total emissions R = 2,000,000,000 over four years with coefficients {0.35, 0.30, 0.20, 0.15}. Year‑t allocation: R_t = R × c_t; weekly split E_week = R_t / W_t; per‑block E_block = R_t / B_t.

6.4 Validator Reward Weights

Effective weight w_i = s_i^β · q_i, β ∈ (0,1], where s_i is stake and q_i is a quality factor (0–1) based on uptime, double‑sign penalties, and vote latency percentiles. Period reward: reward_i = E_period · w_i / Σ w_j.

6.5 Fee Adjustment (EIP‑1559‑like, Proposal)

BaseFee_{k+1} = BaseFee_k · exp[ α · (ρ_k − ρ*) ], where ρ* is target utilization and α tunes responsiveness. Excess fees may be burned to offset inflation.

6.6 Slashing & Penalties

7. Sale & Distribution

7.1 Public Sale

7.2 Community Airdrop S1 (Anti‑Sybil)

7.3 Compliance & Regions

8. Governance (On‑chain)

8.1 Proposal & Voting

8.2 Emergency Mechanics

9. Security

10. Cross‑Chain & Ecosystem

11. Roadmap (Measurable Milestones)

12. Transparency & Status Page

13. Risk Factors & Disclosures

Disclaimer: This is not investment advice. Participants must evaluate risks and comply with local laws.

14. Glossary (Selected)

15. Appendix

15.1 Parameter Sheet (Draft)

15.2 Votor Pseudocode (Snippet)

OnReceiveBlock(b_t):
  if not ConflictsWithLock(b_t):
    vote ← Sign(b_t, round = t)
    SendToLeader(vote)

OnQC(QC_t):
  if Adjacent(QC_{t-1}, QC_t) and LockedOn(QC_{t-1}):
    Commit(Parent(b_t))
  else:
    UpdateLock(QC_t)

15.3 TBF (To‑Be‑Finalized) List

© 2025 Alpenglow (aSOLX). This whitepaper is provided for technical/product planning only and does not constitute investment advice.